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Abstract
We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-
proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model
where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicograph-
ically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized
random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of
length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distri-
bution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over
every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random
dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for strategy-
proof deterministic social choice functions for multi-dimensional models with separable
preferences obtained in LeBreton and Sen (1999).
1 Introduction
Randomization has been used as a method of resolving conflicts of interest since antiquity.
It has been analyzed extensively in a variety of models such as the pure voting model,
∗We are particularly grateful to Huaxia Zeng for a careful reading of the paper and numerous helpful
suggestions. We also thank a referee and the Editor for valuable comments. This research is supported by
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matching and auctions from the perspectives of aggregation, fairness and mechanism de-
sign. 1 In the context of mechanism design, allowing for randomization expands the set
of incentive-compatible social choice functions relative to the deterministic case. This is so
because domain restrictions are inherent in the preference ranking of lotteries that satisfy the
expected utility hypothesis. A classical result in this area is that of Gibbard (1977) which
characterizes the class of strategy-proof random social choice functions over the complete
domain of preferences.
In this paper we investigate the class of strategy-proof random social choice rules over a
specific sub-domain of multi-dimensional (or multi-component) domains with separable pref-
erences. The multi-dimensional separable preferences model is an important one with sev-
eral applications and has been extensively studied in the deterministic setting, for example in
Barbera` et al. (1991), Barbera` et al. (1993), LeBreton and Sen (1999), Barbera` et al. (1997),
Barbera` et al. (2005) and Svensson and Torstensson (2008). For a survey see Sprumont
(1995).
LeBreton and Sen (1999) show that every strategy-proof deterministic social choice func-
tion satisfying unanimity defined over a rich domain of preferences is decomposable, i.e. a
strategy-proof social choice function is composed of strategy-proof social choice functions
defined over each component domain. An immediate consequence of this result and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) is the following: if
the domain is rich and each component domain is complete and has at least three alterna-
tives, then a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if there is a dictator for each
component.
In this paper, we analyze the structure of random strategy-proof social choice functions
(satisfying unanimity) defined over a domain where preferences are separable and compo-
nents are lexicographically ordered. This is the domain of lexicographically separable pref-
erences and is a subset of the domain of all separable preferences. This domain is rich in the
sense of LeBreton and Sen (1999) (see their Example 3.3); according to the result referred
to earlier, every deterministic strategy-proof social choice function over this domain must
be a component random dictatorship. If the decomposability property extended straight-
forwardly to random social choice functions, we would expect strategy-proof random social
choice functions (satisfying unanimity) over this domain to be the stochastic product of com-
ponent random dictatorships. This is false; for instance, random dictatorship itself is clearly
strategy-proof but not the product of component random dictatorships. The latter would
put non-zero probabilities on alternatives that are not first-ranked by any voter unlike a
random dictatorship. Thus products of component random dictatorships are strategy-proof
but do not describe all random strategy-proof choice functions.
1See for example, Barbera` and Sonnenschein (1978), Myerson (1981), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001),
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), Bogomolnaia et al. (2005), Moulin and Stong (2002).
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Our main result is a complete characterization of random strategy-proof social choice
functions satisfying unanimity defined over lexicographically separable domains. We call such
random social choice functions generalized random dictatorships and they include random
dictatorships and products of component random dictatorships. A random dictatorship is a
fixed probability distribution on the set of voters. At any preference profile, the probability of
an alternative is the sum of the probability weights of voters for whom the alternative is the
best. A generalized random dictatorship on the other hand, is a fixed probability distribution
on the set of all voter sequences of length m where m is the number of components. For
instance, if there are three voters and five components, there are 35 possible voter sequences.
A generalized random dictatorship assigns a probability to each of these sequences. An
alternative is consistent with a sequence at a profile if each component of the alternative
is the best (amongst all component alternatives) for the voter specified in the sequence for
that component. The total probability of the alternative at the profile is simply the sum
of probabilities of voter sequences consistent with the alternative. A generalized random
dictatorship thus induces a fixed probability distribution on the product set of the maximal
alternatives of all voters. A critical feature of these social choice functions is that the induced
marginal probability distribution on each component is a random dictatorship.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model, the
notation and the background results. The following section contains the main result and its
proof while the final section concludes.
2 Background and Preliminaries
The set of alternatives is a finite set A ≡ A1 × A2... × Am where Aj, j = 1, ...m is the jth
component set. The set of components will be written as M = {1, ...,m}. An element a ∈ A
is an m-tuple a ≡ (a1, ..., am). For any Q ⊂M , we will let AQ =
∏
j∈QAj. Abusing notation
slightly, we will write AM−j for the set
∏
k 6=j Ak. Typical elements of AM−j will be denoted
by aM−j, bM−j etc.
2.1 Preferences
The set of voters is I = {1, .., N}. Each voter i has an antisymmetric preference ordering P i
over the elements of A which is assumed to be separable.
Definition 1 The ordering P i is separable if for all Q ⊂ M , for all aQ, bQ ∈ AQ, for all
cM−Q, dM−Q ∈ AM−Q,
[(aQ, cM−Q)P i(bQ, cM−Q)]⇒ [(aQ, dM−Q)P i(bQ, dM−Q)].
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If a preference ordering is separable, then choices over a subset of components do not
affect ranking of alternatives over the remaining components. In other words, choices over
components do not impose “externalities” over other components.
A particular class of separable orderings is the class of lexicographically separable or simply
lexicographic orderings.
Definition 2 The ordering P i is lexicographic if there exists an antisymmetric ordering Â
on the set M and antisymmetric orderings P ij on each component set Aj, j ∈ M such that,
for all a, b ∈ A, aP ib iff there exists a component j such that
1. ajP
i
j bj
2. ak = bk for all k ∈M such that k Â j.
Let P i be a lexicographic ordering. We shall refer to the components that are maximal and
minimal according to the ordering Â overM as the lexicographically best and lexicographically
worst components respectively. In general if, components j and k are such that k Â j, we
shall say that component k is lexicographically better than component j.
Let P, DS and DL denote respectively the set of all antisymmetric orderings, the set of
separable orderings, the set of additively separable orderings and the set of lexicographic
preference orderings over A respectively. We note that DL ⊆ DS ⊂ P. 2
A separable preference P i induces a marginal preference ordering P iQ over AQ, Q ⊂ M
in a natural way: for every aQ, bQ ∈ AQ
[aQP
i
QbQ] if [(aQ, cM−Q)P
i(bQ, cM−Q) for all cM−Q ∈ AM−Q].
Let D ⊂ DS. The set of marginal preference orderings over components in the set Q ⊂M
will be denoted by DQ. If Q consists of a single component, we shall write Dj for the set of
orderings induced by D over Aj.
For any D ⊂ P, a preference profile P is an N -tuple (P 1, ..., PN) ∈ DN . For any voter i,
ordering P¯ i and profile P , we shall let (P¯ i, P−i) denote the profile where the ith component
of P has been replaced by P¯ i. A marginal preference profile for components Q is similarly an
N -tuple, PQ ≡ (P 1Q, ..., PNQ ) ∈ DN where D ⊂ DS. We shall say that two profiles P, P¯ ∈ DN
(D ⊂ DS) are marginally equivalent if P ij = P¯ ij for all voters i ∈ I and j ∈M .
2The set of lexicographic orderings coincides with the separable orderings in the special case when there
are two components and exactly two alternatives in every component set. In general DL is a strict subset of
DS .
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2.2 Random Social Choice Functions
We let L(A) denote the set of lotteries over the elements of the set A. If λ ∈ L(A), then
λa will denote the probability that λ puts on a ∈ A. Clearly λa ≥ 0 and
∑
a∈A λa = 1. For
every j ∈M we can define L(Aj) accordingly.
Definition 3 Let D ⊂ P. A Random Social Choice Function (RSCF) (for the domain D)
is a map ϕ : DN → L(A).
Our focus is on RSCFs that are strategy-proof, i.e. those that provide voters with
dominant-strategy incentives to reveal their preference orderings (which are assumed to be
private information), truthfully. In models such as ours where the outcome of voting is a
probability distribution over outcomes, there are several ways to define strategy-proofness.
Here we follow the approach of Gibbard (1977).
Definition 4 A utility function u : A → < represents the ordering P i over A if for all
a, b ∈ A,
[aP ib]⇔ [u(a) > u(b)]
Definition 5 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is manipulable by voter i at profile P ∈ DN via
P¯ i ∈ D if there exists a utility functions u representing P i such that∑
a∈A u(a)ϕa(P¯
i, P−i) >
∑
a∈A u(a)ϕa(P
i, P−i).
Definition 6 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any
voter at any profile. Equivalently, ϕ is strategy-proof if, for all i ∈ I, for all P ∈ DN , for all
P¯ i ∈ D and all utility functions u representing P i, we have∑
a∈A u(a)ϕa(P
i, P−i) ≥∑a∈A u(a)ϕa(P¯ i, P−i).
A RSCF is strategy-proof if at every profile no voter can obtain a higher expected utility
by deviating from her true preference ordering than she would if she announced her true
preference ordering. Here, expected utility is computed with respect an arbitrary utility
representation of her true preferences. It is well-known that this is equivalent to requiring
that the probability distribution from truth-telling stochastically dominates the probability
distribution from misrepresentation in terms of a voter’s true preferences. This is stated
formally below.
For any i ∈ I, P i ∈ D and a ∈ A, we let B(a, P i) = {b ∈ A : bP ia} ∪ {a}, i.e. B(a, P i)
denotes the set of alternatives that are weakly preferred to a according to the ordering P i.
Definition 7 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is manipulable by voter i at profile P ∈ DN via
P¯ i ∈ D if there exists a ∈ A such that
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∑
b∈B(a,P i) ϕb(P¯
i, P−i) >
∑
b∈B(a,P i) ϕb(P
i, P−i).
It is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I, for all P ∈ DN , for all P¯i ∈ D and all a ∈ A, we have∑
b∈B(a,P i) ϕb(P
i, P−i) ≥∑b∈B(a,P i) ϕb(P¯ i, P−i).
We also assume throughout the paper that RSCFs satisfy the standard (and mild) re-
quirement of unanimity. This requires an alternative that is first-ranked by all voters in any
profile to be selected with probability one in that profile. For any P i ∈ D, let τ(P i, A) de-
note the maximal element in A according to P i. Since the domain consists of antisymmetric
orderings and A is finite, a maximal element always exists and is unique.
Definition 8 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) satisfies unanimity if for all P ∈ DN and a ∈ A,
[a = τ(P i, A) for all i ∈ I]⇒ [ϕa(P ) = 1].
We now review some existing results that have a bearing on the results in this paper.
2.3 Existing Results
A RSCF of particular significance is random dictatorship.
Definition 9 Let D ⊂ P. The RSCF ϕr : DN → L(A) is a random dictatorship if there
exist non-negative real numbers βi, i ∈ I with ∑i∈I βi = 1 such that for all P ∈ DN and
a ∈ A,
ϕra(P ) =
∑
{i:τ(P i,A)=a} β
i
In a random dictatorship, each voter i gets weight βi where the sum of these βi’s is one. At
any profile, the probability assigned to an alternative a is simply the sum of the weights of the
voters whose maximal element is a. A random dictatorship is clearly strategy-proof for any
domain; by misrepresentation, a voter can only transfer weight from her most-preferred to a
less-preferred alternative. A fundamental result in Gibbard (1977) states that the converse
is also true for the complete domain P. 3
Theorem 1 [Gibbard (1977) ] Assume |A| ≥ 3. A RSCF ϕ : PN → L(A) is strategy-proof
and satisfies unanimity if and only if it is a random dictatorship.
3Gibbard’s result is actually more general than Theorem 1 below because it does not assume unanimity.
However since unanimity will be a maintained hypothesis throughout the paper, we state only the version
of the result with unanimity. See also Sen (2011) for a generalization of the Gibbard result with unanimity.
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We now recall results for deterministic social choice functions. For convenience, we pro-
vide definitions only for domains D ⊂ DS.
Definition 10 A deterministic social choice function (DSCF) f is a map f : DN → A.
A DSCF is simply a RSCF whose image set is the set of degenerate probability distri-
butions over A. The definitions of strategy-proofness and unanimity for a DSCF are special
cases of those of RSCFs and are omitted.
Definition 11 A DSCF f : [DL]N → A is a component dictatorship if there exists a map
σ :M → N such that for all P ∈ [DL]N ,
[f(P ) = a]⇒ [aj = τ(P σ(j)j , Aj)].
In a component dictatorship, the jth component of the outcome at a profile is the maximal
element of the jth component of voter σ(j). Since preferences are separable for all individuals,
these maximal elements are well-defined. We can imagine the DSCF being decomposable
into component DSCFs which are dictatorial.
Theorem 2 [LeBreton and Sen (1999)] Assume |Aj| ≥ 3 for all j ∈ M . A DSCF f :
[DL]N → A is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity if and only if it is a component dicta-
torship.
The result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.1, in LeBreton and Sen (1999).
2.4 Generalized Random Dictatorships
Does the decomposability property carry over to RSCFs? A particular generalization of
component dictatorship is a RSCF where the probability distribution over the set A is the
product of component random dictatorships. We define this below.
Definition 12 A RSCF is ϕ : [DL]N → L(A) is an independent component random dicta-
torship if for each j ∈ M , there exists a random dictatorship ϕj : PjN → L(Aj) such that
for all P ∈ [DL]N
ϕ(P ) =
∏
j∈M
ϕj(Pj).
Consider the case where there are two voters and two components. Suppose the weight
vectors for components 1 and 2 are (β11 , β
2
1) and (β
1
2 , β
2
2) respectively. Then in any profile
where voter 1 and 2’s maximal elements are a1a2 and b1b2 respectively, the alternatives
a1a2, a1b2, b1a2 and b1b2 get probability weights β
1
1β
1
2 , β
1
1β
2
2 , β
1
2β
2
1 and β
2
1β
2
2 respectively.
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An independent component random dictatorship is strategy-proof (we shall verify this
later) and clearly satisfies unanimity. Is every strategy-proof RSCF defined over the domain
DS with |Aj| ≥ 3 an independent component random dictatorship? No, and this is estab-
lished by the observation that a random dictatorship is strategy-proof but not an independent
component random dictatorship unless it is deterministic, i.e. there exists a voter i such that
βi = 1. Showing that a random dictatorship is strategy-proof is routine. To demonstrate
the other claim, consider for simplicity the case where there are two voters i and k and two
components. Suppose also that βi, βk > 0. Consider a profile where i’s maximal element is
a1a2 and k’s is b1b2 where a1 6= b1 and a2 6= b2. Observe that this RSCF would put proba-
bilities βi and βk on a1a2 and b1b2 respectively and zero on all other alternatives. However
every independent component random dictatorship which puts strictly positive probability
on a1a2 and b1b2 also puts strictly positive probability on the alternatives a1b2 and b1a2.
Below, we formulate a generalization of both random dictatorship and independent com-
ponent random dictatorship which coincides with the class of strategy-proof RSCFs satisfying
unanimity in the case where each component set has at least three alternatives.
Let i ≡ (i1, . . . , im) ∈ Im be an m-tuple of voters. We shall call such an m-tuple, a voter
sequence. We note that a voter may appear multiple times in a voter sequence. For all a ∈ A
and P ∈ [DS]N , we shall let χ(a, P ) denote the set of voter sequences consistent with a and
P where χ(a, P ) = {i ∈ Im : aj = τ(P ijj , Aj) for all j = 1, . . .m}.
Definition 13 A RSCF ϕg : [DS]N → L(A) is a generalized random dictatorship if there
exist non-negative real numbers γ(i) for all i ∈ Im with ∑i∈Im γ(i) = 1 such that for all
a ∈ A and P ∈ [DS]N ,
ϕga(P ) =
∑
i∈χ(a,P )
γ(i).
Consider the following example. Suppose I = {1, 2} and Aj = {aj, bj, cj} with j = 1, 2.
Here i is one of four, two-tuples (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1) and (2, 2). The function γ specifies four
non-negative real numbers γ(1, 1), γ(1, 2), γ(2, 1) and γ(2, 2) which sum to one. Consider
a profile P where the maximal alternatives of voters 1 and 2 are (a1a2) and (b1b2) respec-
tively. Observe that χ((a1a2), P ) = {(1, 1)}, χ((a1b2), P ) = {(1, 2)}, χ((b1a2), P ) = {(2, 1)}
and χ((b1b2), P ) = {(2, 2)}. Hence, a generalized random dictatorship puts probabilities
of γ(1, 1), γ(1, 2), γ(2, 1) and γ(2, 2) on (a1a2), (a1b2), (b1a2) and (b1b2) respectively and
zero on all other alternatives. Consider another profile P¯ where voter 1 and 2’s maximal
alternatives are (a1, c2) and (a1b2) respectively. Here χ((a1c2), P¯ ) = {(1, 1), (2, 1)}, and
χ((a1b2), P ) = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. Hence this RSCF will put probability γ(1, 1) + γ(2, 1) on
(a1c2) and γ(1, 2) + γ(2, 2) on (a1b2) and zero on everything else.
In general, a generalized random dictatorship is specified by Nm non-negative real num-
bers adding up to one. For any i ≡ (i1, . . . , im), the probability of an alternative a in profile
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P is the sum of γ(i)’s over those i’s which have the property that for every j = 1, . . . ,m, aj
is the maximal element in Aj for voter ij, i.e. over all elements of the set χ(a, P ).
We make several observations about generalized random dictatorships.
Observation 1 The value of a generalized random dictatorship at a profile depends only
on the maximal alternatives (or “tops”) of voter preferences at the profile. However it may
assign positive probabilities to all elements of the product set of the top alternatives. In
other words, a generalized random dictatorship is a probability distribution over the set∏
j∈M{τ(P 1j , Aj), . . . , τ(PNj , Aj)}.
Observation 2 Let ϕg be a generalized random dictatorship with an associated map γ.
Pick a component j, a voter s and let βs =
∑
{i≡(i1,...,im):ij=s} γ(i). Clearly 0 ≤ βs ≤ 1 and∑
s∈I β
s = 1. For any profile P ∈ [DS]N , observe that the probability of aj ∈ Aj in the
marginal distribution ϕgj (P ) is
∑
{s:τ(P sj )=aj} β
s. Hence, a generalized random dictatorship
induces a marginal random social choice function over each component that is a random
dictatorship with respect to marginal preferences over that component. More formally, if ϕg
is a generalized random dictatorship, there exist component random dictatorships ϕrj : PN →
L(Aj), j = 1, . . . ,m such that for all P ∈ [DS]N , ϕgj (P ) = ϕrj(Pj) for each j = 1, . . .m.
Observation 3 A random dictatorship is a special case of a generalized random dictator-
ship when γ(i) = 0 for all voter sequences i such that ij 6= ij′ for some j 6= j′. Equivalently,
γ(i) > 0 implies i = (i, i, . . . , i) for some i ∈ I.
Observation 4 An independent component random dictatorship is a special case of a gen-
eralized random dictatorship. Define the component random dictatorships as follows: for all
j = 1, . . . ,m, let γj(i), i = 1, . . . , N be non-negative real numbers with
∑
i∈I γj(i) = 1. Now
define a generalized random dictatorship as follows: for all voter sequences i ≡ (i1, . . . , im),
γ(i) = γ1(i1)× γ2(i2)× . . .× γm(im).
Observation 5 In the special case where m = 1, a generalized random dictatorship is
simply a random dictatorship.
In the next section we show that all strategy-proof RSCFs satisfying unanimity are gen-
eralized random dictatorships.
3 The Result
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3 Assume |Aj| ≥ 3 for all j = 1, . . . ,m. A RSCF ϕ : [DL]N → L(A) is strategy-
proof and satisfies unanimity if and only if it is a generalized random dictatorship.
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Proof : (Sufficiency) We show that generalized random dictatorships satisfy unanimity and
strategy-proofness over the domain DS. Unanimity follows from Observation 1. We show
strategy-proofness. Let ϕg be a generalized random dictatorship specified by the function
γ in Definition 13. Let P ∈ [DS]N be an arbitrary profile and let i be an arbitrary voter.
Consider a possible manipulation by i at P via P¯ i. It follows from the definition of a
generalized random dictatorship that the value of ϕg at any profile depends only on the
maximal alternatives of voters at the profile. Let τ(P i) = a and τ(P¯ i) = b where bQ 6= aQ
and aM−Q = bM−Q for some non-empty subset Q of M .
Pick an arbitrary i ≡ (i1, . . . , im) ∈ Im. If ij 6= i for any j ∈ Q then probability γ(i) is
assigned to the same alternative under profiles P and (P¯ i, P−i). If ij = i for all j ∈ T for some
T ⊆ Q, then probability γ(i) is shifted from alternative (aT , xM−T ) for some xM−T ∈ AM−T
in profile P to (bT , xM−T ) in profile (P¯ i, P−i). However ajP ij bj for all j ∈ T by assumption
so that (aT , xM−T )P i(bT , xM−T ) by separability. Therefore the distribution ϕg(P¯ i, P−i) is
obtained from ϕg(P ) by transferring probabilities from higher-ranked alternatives to lower-
ranked alternatives according to P i. Clearly ϕg(P ) stochastically dominates ϕg(P¯ i, P−i)
according to P i and ϕg is strategy-proof.
(Necessity) We proceed as follows. The proof consists of three steps. In Step 1, we establish
an important “conditional unanimity” property; in Step 2 we establish generalized random
dictatorship in the case of two voters and in Step 3 we extend the result to an arbitrary
number of voters using induction on the number of voters.
We begin with a Lemma which holds for arbitrary domains and is a straightforward
adaptation of a result in Gibbard (1977).
Let D be an arbitrary domain. Let P i ∈ D and let x, y ∈ A and assume that xP iy. We
say x and y are contiguous in P i if there does not exist z ∈ A distinct from x and y such
that xP izP iy. We say that the ordering P¯i is a feasible local switch of x and y in P
i if (i) x
and y are contiguous (ii) xP iy and yP¯ ix (iii)B(x, P i) ∪ {y} = B(y, P¯ i) ∪ {x} (iv) P¯ i ∈ D.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ : DN → L(A) be strategy-proof. Let i be an arbitrary voter and let P¯ i be a
feasible local switch of x and y in P i. Then
(i) ϕy(P¯
i, P−i) ≥ ϕy(P ).
(ii) ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕy(P¯ i, P−i) = ϕx(P ) + ϕy(P ).
We omit the proof of this Lemma which is an implication of the definition of strategy-
proofness.
Consider an arbitrary strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : [DL]N → L(A) satisfying unanimity. We
will show that ϕ is a generalized random dictatorship. Recall that every P i ∈ DL induces an
ordering P iQ over AQ for every Q ⊂M .
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We establish some preliminary lemmas. Let Â be an ordering over the set M and let
j ∈ M . Then E(Â, j) = {i ∈ M : i Â j}. Thus E(Â, j) is the set of components which
lexicographically dominate j.
Lemma 2 Let P ∈ [DL]N and i ∈ I. Let P i and P¯ i be lexicographic with respect to Â and
Â′ and let j be a component such that (i) E(Â, j) = E(Â′, j) = Q and (ii) P iQ∪{j} = P¯ iQ∪{j}.
Then
(a) ϕk(P ) = ϕk(P¯
i, P−i) for all k ∈ Q ∪ {j}.
(b) Let aQ ∈ AQ. Then ϕQ∪{j},aQ∪{j}(P ) = ϕQ∪{j},aQ∪{j}(P¯ i, P−i).
Before proving the Lemma, we provide an intermediate Proposition.
Proposition 1 For all P i, P¯ i ∈ DL, P−i ∈ [DL]N−1 and T ⊂M (T 6= ∅), if ϕT (P i, P−i) =
ϕT (P¯
i, P−i), then ϕTˆ (P
i, P−i) = ϕTˆ (P¯
i, P−i) for all Tˆ ⊂ T where Tˆ 6= ∅.
Proof : For all aTˆ ∈ ATˆ , we have the following:
ϕTˆ ,aTˆ
(P i, P−i) =
∑
xM−Tˆ∈AM−Tˆ
ϕ(aTˆ ,xM−Tˆ )(P
i, P−i)
=
∑
xT−Tˆ∈AT−Tˆ
∑
xM−T∈AM−T
ϕ(aTˆ ,xT−Tˆ ,xM−T )(P
i, P−i)
=
∑
xT−Tˆ∈AT−Tˆ
ϕT,(aTˆ ,xT−Tˆ )(P
i, P−i)
=
∑
xT−Tˆ∈AT−Tˆ
ϕT,(aTˆ ,xT−Tˆ )(P¯
i, P−i)
=
∑
xT−Tˆ∈AT−Tˆ
∑
xM−T∈AM−T
ϕ(aTˆ ,xT−Tˆ ,xM−T )(P¯
i, P−i)
=
∑
xM−Tˆ∈AM−Tˆ
ϕ(aTˆ ,xM−Tˆ )(P¯
i, P−i)
= ϕTˆ ,aTˆ
(P¯ i, P−i)
¥
We now return to the proof of the Lemma.
Proof : In view of Lemma 1, in order to show (a), it suffices to show (b).
To simplify the notation, let Q¯ = Q ∪ {j}. Now, suppose ϕQ¯(P ) 6= ϕQ¯(P¯ i, P−i). Let
cQ¯ be the P
i
Q¯
−maximal alternative such that ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P i, P−i) 6= ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯ i, P−i). Therefore,
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for all xQ¯ ∈ AQ¯ with xQ¯P iQ¯ cQ¯, we have ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P ) = ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P¯ i, P−i). Then, we consider the
following 2 cases.
Case 1: ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P ) < ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯
i, P−i).
Let wM−Q¯ denote the P iM−Q¯ − minimal alternative. Consider (cQ¯, wM−Q¯) and B¯ =
B
(
(cQ¯, wM−Q¯), P i
)
. Since all components in Q¯ lexicographically dominate all components
in M − Q¯, we know that B¯ = {x ∈ A : either xQ¯P iQ¯ cQ¯, or xQ¯ = cQ¯}. Then,∑
x∈B¯
ϕx(P
i, P−i) =
∑
xQ¯P
i
Q¯
cQ¯
∑
xM−Q¯∈AM−Q¯
ϕ(xQ¯,xM−Q¯)(P
i, P−i) +
∑
xM−Q¯∈AM−Q¯
ϕ(cQ¯,xM−Q¯)(P
i, P−i)
=
∑
xQ¯P
i
Q¯
cQ¯
ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P
i, P−i) + ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P
i, P−i)
<
∑
xQ¯P
i
Q¯
cQ¯
ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯
i, P−i)
=
∑
x∈B¯
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i)
Therefore, voter i manipulates at (P i, P−i) via P¯ i.
Case 2: ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P ) > ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯
i, P−i).
Let w¯Q¯ denote P¯
i
M−Q¯ − minimal alternative. We claim that cQ¯ is the P¯ iQ¯ − maximal
alternative such that ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯
i, P−i) 6= ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P i, P−i).
Suppose not. Then there exists dQ¯ ∈ AQ¯ such that dQ¯P¯ iQ¯ cQ¯ and ϕQ¯,dQ¯(P¯ i, P−i) 6=
ϕQ¯,dQ¯(P
i, P−i). Since P i
Q¯
= P¯ i
Q¯
, we have that dQ¯P
i
Q¯
cQ¯ and ϕQ¯,dQ¯(P¯
i, P−i) 6= ϕQ¯,dQ¯(P i, P−i),
which is a contradiction to the definition of cQ¯. Therefore, for all xQ¯ ∈ AQ¯ with xQ¯P¯ iQ¯ cQ¯,
we have ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P
i, P−i).
Now, consider (cQ¯, w¯M−Q¯) and Bˆ = B
(
(cQ¯, w¯M−Q¯), P¯ i
)
. Since all components in Q¯ lexi-
cographically dominate all components inM−Q¯, we know Bˆ = {x ∈ A : either xQ¯P¯ iQ¯ cQ¯, or xQ¯ =
cQ¯}. Then,∑
x∈Bˆ
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) =
∑
xQ¯P¯
i
Q¯
cQ¯
∑
xM−Q¯∈AM−Q¯
ϕ(xQ¯,xM−Q¯)(P¯
i, P−i) +
∑
xM−Q¯∈AM−Q¯
ϕ(cQ¯,xM−Q¯)(P¯
i, P−i)
=
∑
xQ¯P¯
i
Q¯
cQ¯
ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P¯
i, P−i)
<
∑
xQ¯P¯
i
Q¯
cQ¯
ϕQ¯,xQ¯(P
i, P−i) + ϕQ¯,cQ¯(P
i, P−i)
=
∑
x∈Bˆ
ϕx(P
i, P−i)
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Hence, voter i manipulates at (P¯ i, P−i) via P i. Therefore ϕQ¯(P i, P−i) = ϕQ¯(P¯ i, P−i). ¥
We say that orderings P i, P¯ i ∈ [DL] are marginally equivalent if P ij = P¯ ij for all j ∈ M .
Similarly, we will say that profiles P, P¯ ∈ [DL]N are marginally equivalent if P i and P¯ i are
marginally equivalent for all i ∈ I.
Lemma 3 Let P ∈ [DL]N , i ∈ I and P¯ i ∈ DL be such that (i) P i and P¯ i are marginally
equivalent and (ii) if P i and P¯ i are lexicographic with respect to the orderings Â and Â¯ over
M respectively, then Â and Â¯ agree over all components except j and k where j and k are
contiguous in Â. If ϕ(P ) 6= ϕ(P¯ i, P−i) then ϕj(P ) 6= ϕj(P¯ i, P−i) and ϕk(P ) 6= ϕk(P¯ i, P−i).
Proof : Suppose the Lemma is false. In view of Lemma 2, we can assume that j and k are
the lexicographic best and second best components respectively in P i and the lexicographic
second and best components in P¯ i respectively. We have therefore assumed that ϕ(P i, P−i) 6=
ϕ(P¯ i, P−i) but ϕl(P i, P−i) = ϕl(P¯ i, P−i) for all components l. Let a be the highest ranked
alternative in P i such that ϕa(P
i, P−i) 6= ϕa(P¯ i, P−i). Since ϕ is strategy-proof, it must be
the case that ϕa(P
i, P−i) > ϕa(P¯ i, P−i). Let Y = {x ∈ A : xkP¯ ikak} = {x ∈ A : xkP ikak}
(since P¯ ik = P
i
k). Let Z = {x ∈ A : xk = ak and xP¯ ika}. Note that Z = {x ∈ A : xk =
ak and xP
ia} since P i and P¯ i are marginally equivalent orderings and the lexicographic
ordering of components in M \ k in the two orderings is also the same. Note the following
(i) B(a, P¯ i) = Y ∪ Z ∪ {a}
(ii) ϕz(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕz(P i, P−i) for all z ∈ Z since z ∈ Z implies that zP ia and a is the
highest-ranked alternative P i such that ϕa(P
i, P−i) 6= ϕa(P¯ i, P−i) and
(iii)
∑
{xk:xkP¯ ikak} ϕk,xk(P¯
i, P−i) =
∑
{xk:xkP¯ ikak} ϕk,xk(P
i, P−i) by virtue of our assumption
that the ϕ yields the same marginal probability distribution all over components.
Hence,
∑
x∈B(a,P¯ i)
ϕx(P
i, P−i) =
∑
x∈Y
ϕx(P
i, P−i) +
∑
x∈Z
ϕx(P
i, P−i) + ϕa(P i, P−i)
=
∑
{xk:xkP ikak}
ϕk,xk(P
i, P−i) +
∑
x∈Z
ϕx(P
i, P−i) + ϕa(P i, P−i)
>
∑
{xk:xkP¯ ikak}
ϕk,xk(P¯
i, P−i) +
∑
x∈Z
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕa(P¯ i, P−i)
=
∑
x∈Y
ϕk,xk(P¯
i, P−i) +
∑
x∈Z
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕa(P¯ i, P−i)
=
∑
x∈B(a,P¯ i)
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i)
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Consequently voter i manipulates at (P¯ i, P−i) via P i contradicting the strategy-proofness
of ϕ. ¥
STEP 1: The goal of this Step is to show the following. Pick an arbitrary non-empty subset
Q ⊂ M . Then there exists a unanimous, strategy-proof RSCF ϕQ : [DLQ]N → L(AQ) such
that for all profiles P ∈ [DL]N satisfying τ(P iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q for all i ∈ I, we have
1. [ϕx(P ) > 0]⇒ [xM−Q = aM−Q] and
2. ϕ(xQ,aM−Q)(P ) = ϕ
Q
xQ
(PQ) for all xQ ∈ AQ.
Thus, there exists a strategy-proof RSCF ϕQ defined for every non-empty set of com-
ponents Q with the property that whenever all voters are unanimous with respect to say
aM−Q ∈ AM−Q, then ϕ (i) puts strictly positive probability only on those alternatives whose
M −Q are given by aM−Q and (ii) the probability of an alternative (aQ, aM−Q) in the profile
P is the probability given to aQ in the RSCF ϕ
Q in the component Q induced profile PQ.
Moreover ϕQ satisfies unanimity.
The arguments involved in Step 1 are generalizations of counterparts in LeBreton and Sen
(1999).
The first lemma asserts that ϕ satisfies a conditional unanimity property.
Lemma 4 Let Q ⊂ M , P ∈ [DL]N and a ∈ A be such that τ(P iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q for all
i ∈ I. Then [ϕb(P ) > 0]⇒ [bM−Q = aM−Q].
Proof : Suppose that the Lemma is false. Assume that τ(P iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q for all i ∈ I
but ϕb(P ) > 0 where bM−Q 6= aM−Q. For all i ∈ I, let P¯ i ∈ DL be such that (i) P¯ ik = P ik for
all k ∈M −Q (ii) τ(P¯ iQ, AQ) = bQ and (iii) all components in Q lexicographically dominate
all components in M −Q.
Pick an arbitrary voter i and suppose ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) = 0 whenever xQ = bQ. For any
k ∈ M − Q, let dk ∈ Ak be the worst ranked element in Ak according to P¯ ik (and P ik). Let
B¯ = B((bQ, dM−Q), P¯ i). Since components in Q lexicographically dominate those in M −Q
in P¯ i, it follows that c ∈ B¯ ⇒ [cQ = bQ]. Therefore∑
x∈B¯
ϕx(P
i, P−i) ≥ ϕb(P ) > 0 =
∑
x∈B¯
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i).
Hence i manipulates ϕ at (P¯ i, P−i) via P i. Therefore, ϕ(bQ,cM−Q)(P¯
i, P−i) > 0 for some
cM−Q ∈ AM−Q.
Now suppose ϕ(bQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, P−i) = 1. Let Bˆ = B((bQ, aM−Q), P i). Note that
(bQ, aM−Q)P ib since aM−Q = τ(P i, AM−Q). Since∑
x∈Bˆ
ϕx(P
i, P−i) <
∑
x∈Bˆ
ϕx(P¯
i, P−i) = 1
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voter i will manipulate at P via P¯ i. Therefore ϕ(bQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, P−i) < 1.
We can conclude from the arguments in the two previous paragraphs that there exists
cM−Q ∈ AM−Q \ {aM−Q} such that ϕ(bQ,cM−Q)(P¯ i, P−i) > 0. Now pick a voter i′ 6= i and
replace P i
′
in the profile (P¯ i, P−i) by P¯ i
′
. Replicating the arguments above, we can conclude
that there exists dM−Q ∈ AM−Q \ {aM−Q} such that ϕ(bQ,dM−Q)(P¯ i, P¯ i′ , P¯−i,i′) > 0. Proceed-
ing in this manner, it follows that ϕ(bQ,xM−Q)(P¯ ) > 0 where xM−Q ∈ AM−Q \ {aM−Q}. But
all voters have (bQ, aM−Q) as their first-ranked alternative in the profile P¯ . Hence ϕ violates
unanimity completing the proof of the Lemma. ¥
For every Q ⊂M and a ∈ A, let [DL(a,Q)]N ⊂ [DL]N be the set of lexicographic profiles
P with the property that τ(P iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q for all i ∈ I.
Lemma 5 Let Q ⊂ M and a ∈ A. Let Pˆ , P¯ ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N be such that PˆQ = P¯Q. Then
ϕ(Pˆ ) = ϕ(P¯ ).
Proof : It follows from Lemma 4 that [ϕb(Pˆ ) > 0] ⇒ [bM−Q = aM−Q] and [ϕb(P¯ ) > 0] ⇒
[bM−Q = aM−Q]. We first claim that ϕ(P¯ i, Pˆ−i) = ϕ(Pˆ ) for an arbitrary voter i. Suppose
this is false. Let cQ be the best-alternative in AQ according to Pˆ
i
Q = P¯
i
Q such that
ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, Pˆ−i) 6= ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(P¯ i, Pˆ−i).
Such an alternative cQ must exist. If
ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, Pˆ−i) > ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(Pˆ )
then ∑
x∈B((cQ,aM−Q),Pˆ i)
ϕx(P¯
i, Pˆ−i) >
∑
x∈B((cQ,aM−Q),Pˆ i)
ϕx(Pˆ )
contradicting the strategy-proofness of ϕ. If
ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, Pˆ−i) < ϕ(cQ,aM−Q)(Pˆ )
then ∑
x∈B((bQ,aM−Q),P¯ i)
ϕx(Pˆ ) >
∑
x∈B((cQ,aM−Q),P¯ i)
ϕx(P¯
i, Pˆ−i)
again contradicting the strategy-proofness of ϕ. Therefore ϕ(P¯ i, Pˆ−i) = ϕ(Pˆ ). Progres-
sively switching preferences of voters from Pˆ i to P¯ i and repeatedly applying these arguments
above yields ϕ(Pˆ ) = ϕ(P¯ ) as required. ¥
Let a ∈ A and Q ⊂ M . We define the function ϕa,Q : [DLQ]N → L(AQ) as follows: for
all P ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N and xQ ∈ AQ, ϕa,QxQ (PQ) = ϕ(xQ,aM−Q)(P ), where PQ is the induced
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profile of preferences of P . Thus we obtain ϕa,Q by considering a profile P ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N
and equating the probability that ϕa,Q(PQ) gives to every bQ ∈ AQ with ϕ(bj ,aM−Q)(P ). A
critical observation is that Lemma 5 implies that ϕa,Q is well-defined. The next Lemma
demonstrates that it is strategy-proof.
Lemma 6 ϕa,Q is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity.
Proof : Suppose ϕa,Q is not strategy-proof. Then there must exist i ∈ I, PQ ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N ,
P¯ iQ ∈ [DL(a,Q)] and bQ ∈ AQ such that∑
xQ∈B(bQ,P iQ)
ϕa,QxQ (P¯
i
Q, P
−i
Q ) >
∑
xQ∈B(bQ,P iQ)
ϕa,QxQ (PQ).
Let Pˆ ∈ [DL]N be a profile and P˜ i ∈ DL be an ordering such that (i) PˆQ = PQ (ii)
τ(Pˆ tM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q for all voters t ∈ I (iii) all components in Q are lexicographically
dominated by those in M −Q in Pˆ t for all t ∈ I (iv) P˜ iQ = P¯ iQ (v) τ(P˜ iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q
and (vi) all components in Q are lexicographically dominated by those in M −Q in P˜ i.
By construction, the profiles Pˆ , (P˜ i, Pˆ−i) ∈ [DS(a,Q)]N . Hence Lemma 4 implies that
[ϕb(Pˆ ) > 0] ⇒ [bM−Q = aM−Q] and [ϕb(P˜ i, Pˆ−i) > 0] ⇒ [bM−Q = aM−Q]. Since com-
ponents in Q are lexicographically dominated by those in M − Q in both Pˆ i and P˜ i and
τ(Pˆ iM−Q, AM−Q) = aM−Q we must haveB((bQ, aM−Q), Pˆ
i) = {(xQ, aM−Q) : xQ ∈ B(bQ, Pˆ iQ)}.
Consequently ∑
x∈B((bQ,aM−Q),Pˆ i)
ϕx(P˜
i, Pˆ−i) =
∑
xQ∈B(bQ,Pˆ iQ)
ϕa,QxQ (P˜
i
Q, Pˆ
−i
Q )
=
∑
xQ∈B(bQ,P iQ)
ϕa,QxQ (P˜
i
Q, Pˆ
−i
Q )
>
∑
xQ∈B(bQ,P iQ)
ϕa,QxQ (PQ)
=
∑
x∈B((bQ,aM−Q),Pˆ i)
ϕx(Pˆ ).
contradicting the strategy-proofness of ϕ. Therefore ϕa,Q is strategy-proof.
Now let P be a profile such that PQ ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N be a profile such that all voters are
unanimous with respect to components in Q, i.e. suppose τ(P iQ, AQ) = bQ for some bQ ∈ AQ.
Clearly τ(P i, A) = (bQ, aM−Q). Since ϕ satisfies unanimity, ϕ(P ) = (bQ, aM−Q) which implies
that ϕa,Q(PQ) = bQ. Therefore ϕ
a,Q satisfies unanimity. ¥
Lemma 7 ϕa,Q does not depend on a i.e. ϕa,Q = ϕb,Q for all b ∈ A.
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Proof : Given any a, b ∈ A, Q ⊂ M and PQ ∈ [DLQ]N , consider following two profiles
P¯ ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N and Pˆ ∈ [DL(b,Q)]N such that (i) P¯Q = PˆQ = PQ, (ii) Q lexicographically
dominates M − Q in P¯ i for all i ∈ I and (iii) Q lexicographically dominates M − Q in Pˆ i
for all i ∈ I. Then, by Lemma 4, we have that for all xQ ∈ AQ,
ϕQ,xQ(P¯
i, P¯−i) ≡
∑
xM−Q∈AM−Q
ϕ(xQ,xM−Q)(P¯
i, P¯−i) = ϕ(xQ,aM−Q)(P¯
i, P¯−i)
ϕQ,xQ(Pˆ
i, Pˆ−i) ≡
∑
xM−Q∈AM−Q
ϕ(xQ,xM−Q)(Pˆ
i, Pˆ−i) = ϕ(xQ,bM−Q)(Pˆ
i, Pˆ−i)
Since P¯ ∈ [DL(a,Q)]N and Pˆ ∈ [DL(b,Q)]N we know that ϕa,QxQ (PQ) = ϕ(xQ,aM−Q)(P¯ i, P¯−i)
and ϕb,QxQ (PQ) = ϕ(xQ,bM−Q)(Pˆ
i, Pˆ−i) for all xQ ∈ AQ. Hence, ϕa,QxQ (PQ) = ϕQ,xQ(P¯ i, P¯−i) and
ϕb,QxQ (PQ) = ϕQ,xQ(Pˆ
i, Pˆ−i) for all xQ ∈ AQ.
Since P¯ iQ = Pˆ
i
Q, and Q lexicographically dominates M − Q in both P¯ iQ and Pˆ iQ, we can
apply Lemma 2 to obtain the following conclusion: ϕQ(P¯
i, P¯−i) = ϕQ(Pˆ i, P¯−i). Applying the
same argument to all other voters, we have that ϕQ(P¯
i, P¯−i) = ϕQ(Pˆ i, Pˆ−i). Consequently,
ϕa,QxQ (PQ) = ϕ
b,Q
xQ
(PQ) for all xQ ∈ AQ. ¥
This concludes Step 1.
Step 2: The goal of this step is to show the following: Let I = {1, 2} and let ϕ :
[DL]2 → L(A) be a strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity. Then ϕ is a generalized
random dictatorship. Throughout Step 2, we assume that ϕ is a two-voter RSCF defined on
the domain of lexicographic preferences that is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity.
For any P ∈ [DL]2, the Top Product Set at P or TPS(P ) is defined as follows:
TPS(P ) ≡ [{τ(P 11 , A1)} ∪ {τ(P 21 , A1)}]× . . .× [{τ(P 1m, Am)} ∪ {τ(P 2m, Am)}].
We say that ϕ satisfies the TPS Property if∑
a∈TPS(P )
ϕa(P ) = 1 for all P ∈ [DL]2.
Lemma 8 ϕ satisfies the TPS Property.
Proof : Suppose the Lemma is false. Then there exists P ∈ [DL]2, a, b, c ∈ A and j ∈ M
such that ϕc(P ) > 0 and τ(P
1, A) = a, τ(P 2, A) = b and cj /∈ {aj, bj}. We consider two
mutually exhaustive cases.
Case 1: Component j is the lexicographically worst component in P 1 and P 2.
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Claim 1: If ϕj,xj(P ) > 0 where xj /∈ {aj, bj}, then ajP 1j xjP 1j bj and bjP 2j xjP 2j aj.
Suppose that the Claim is false. Assume without loss of generality that bjP
1
j xj and
ϕj,xj(P ) > 0. Consider P¯
1 ∈ DL such that (i) P¯ 1M−j = P 1M−j (ii) τ(P¯ 1j , Aj) = bj and
(iii) component j is lexicographically worst in P¯ 1. By Lemmas 2 and 4, we have that∑
zj∈Aj ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2) =
∑
zj∈Aj ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕ(yM−j ,bj)(P¯
1, P 2).
Since ϕ(yM−j ,xj)(P
1, P 2) > 0, it must be the case that
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2) <
∑
zj∈Aj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2)
= ϕ(yM−j ,bj)(P¯
1, P 2).
Since bjP
1
j xj, Lemma 4 implies that
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕ(yM−j ,bj)(P¯
1, P 2). There-
fore,
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2) <
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2).
By virtue of the fact that component j is lexicographically worst in P 1, it follows that
B¯ = B
(
(yM−j, xj), P 1
)
\{(yM−j, xj)} = {z ∈ A : zM−jP 1M−jyM−j or zM−j = yM−j and zjP 1j xj}.
An application of Lemma 2 yields∑
z∈B¯
ϕz(P
1, P 2) =
∑
zM−jP 1M−jyM−j
∑
zj∈Aj
ϕ(zM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2) +
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2)
=
∑
zM−jP 1M−jyM−j
∑
zj∈Aj
ϕ(zM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) +
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P
1, P 2)
<
∑
zM−jP 1M−jyM−j
∑
zj∈Aj
ϕ(zM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) +
∑
zjP 1j xj
ϕ(yM−j ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2)
=
∑
z∈B¯
ϕz(P¯
1, P 2)
Therefore, voter 1 will manipulate at (P 1, P 2) via P¯ 1. This proves Claim 1.
In view of Claim 1, we can assume that ajP
1
j cjP
1
j bj and bjP
2
j cjP
2
j aj. Let P¯
1 ∈ DL be
such that (i) P¯ 1M−j = P
1
M−j (ii) τ(P¯
1
j , Aj) = aj and bj is ranked second in Aj according to
P¯ 1j and (iii) j is lexicographically worst in P¯
i. We claim that ϕj,aj(P ) = ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2). If
ϕj,aj(P ) < ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2), then we can construct an argument analogous to the one above to
show that 1 manipulates at P via P¯ 1. If the reverse is true, 1 manipulates at (P¯ 1, P 2) via
P 1. It follows from our earlier arguments that ϕj,zj(P¯
1, P 2) = 0 for all zj 6= aj, bj. Since
ϕj,cj(P ) > 0 and ϕj,aj(P ) = ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2), we must have ϕj,bj(P ) < ϕj,bj(P¯
1, P 2).
Now construct P¯ 2 ∈ DL be such that (i) P¯ 2M−j = P 2M−j (ii) τ(P¯ 2j , Aj) = bj and aj is
ranked second in Aj according to P¯
2
j and (iii) component j is lexicographically worst in P¯
2.
From our earlier arguments ϕj,zj(P¯ ) = 0 for all zj 6= aj, bj and ϕj,bj(P¯ ) = ϕj,bj(P¯ 1, P 2).
Therefore ϕj,aj(P¯ ) = ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2). Hence ϕj,bj(P¯ ) > ϕj,bj(P ).
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Now consider ϕj(P
1, P¯ 2). Using the same arguments as before, we can deduce that
ϕj,bj(P ) = ϕj,bj(P
1, P¯ 2), ϕj,aj(P ) < ϕj,aj(P
1, P¯ 2) and ϕj,zj(P
1, P¯ 2) = 0 for all zj 6= aj, bj.
Furthermore ϕj,bj(P¯ ) = ϕj,bj(P
1, P¯ 2), ϕj,aj(P¯ ) = ϕj,aj(P
1, P¯ 2) and ϕj,zj(P¯ ) = 0 for all zj 6=
aj, bj. Hence ϕj,bj(P¯ ) = ϕj,bj(P ) contradicting our earlier conclusion that ϕj,bj(P¯ ) > ϕj,bj(P ).
This completes Case 1.
Case 2: Case 1 does not hold. Assume without loss of generality that j is not the lexicograph-
ically worst component in P 1. Let S and T denote the set of components lexicographically
worse than j and lexicographically better than j respectively. Let P¯ 1 ∈ DL such that (i)
P¯ 1T∪{j} = P
1
T∪{j}, (ii) the set of components lexicographically better than j in P¯
1 is T and
(iii) τ(P¯ 1S , AS) = bs.
Suppose ϕj(P¯
1, P 2) 6= ϕj(Pˆ 1, P 2). Since j ∈ T ∪ {j}, it must be true that
ϕT∪{j}(P¯ 1, P 2) 6= ϕT∪{j}(Pˆ 1, P 2). Let (xT , xj) be P¯ 1T∪{j}-maximal such that
ϕT∪{j},(xT ,xj)(P¯
1, P 2) 6= ϕT∪{j},(xT ,xj)(Pˆ 1, P 2). Since τ(P¯ 1S , AS) = τ(Pˆ 1S , AS) = τ(P 2S , AS) =
bS, we can apply Lemma 4, we know that ϕT∪{j},(xT ,xj)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) and
ϕT∪{j},(xT ,xj)(Pˆ
1, P 2) = ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2). Hence, ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) 6= ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ 1, P 2).
Assume first that ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) < ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2). Since in P¯ 1, T lexicographically
dominates j and j lexicographically dominates S, we know that B¯ = B
(
(xT , xj, bS), P¯
1
)
=
{z ∈ A : (zT , zj)P¯ 1T∪{j}(xT , xj)} ∪ {(xT , xj, bS)}. Then,∑
z∈B¯
ϕz(P¯
1, P 2) =
∑
(zT ,zj)P¯
1
T∪{j}(xT ,xj)
∑
zS∈AS
ϕ(zT ,zj ,zS)(P¯
1, P 2) + ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2)
<
∑
(zT ,zj)P¯
1
T∪{j}(xT ,xj)
∑
zS∈AS
ϕ(zT ,zj ,zS)(Pˆ
1, P 2) + ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2)
=
∑
z∈B¯
ϕz(Pˆ
1, P 2)
Therefore, voter 1 will manipulate at (P¯ 1, P 2) via Pˆ 1.
Next, assume that ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) > ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2). Since T lexicographically
dominates S and S lexicographically dominates j in Pˆ 1, we know that
Bˆ = B
(
(xT , xj, bS), Pˆ
1
)
= {z ∈ A : zT Pˆ 1TxT , or zT = xT , zS = bS and zjPˆ 1j xj} ∪
{(xT , xj, bS)}.
Since Pˆ 1 and P¯ 1 agree on the lexicographic order over T , T lexicographically dominates
M − T in both Pˆ 1 and P¯ 1 and Pˆ 1k = P¯ 1k for all k ∈M , we can conclude that Pˆ 1T = P¯ 1T . Fur-
thermore, since T lexicographically dominates M − T in both Pˆ 1 and P¯ 1, Lemma 2 implies
ϕT (Pˆ
1, P 2) = ϕT (P¯
1, P 2) and hence
∑
zT Pˆ
1
T xT
ϕT,zT (Pˆ
1, P 2) =
∑
zT Pˆ
1
T xT
ϕT,zT (P¯
1, P 2). Also,
for any zj ∈ Aj with zjPˆ 1j xj, we know that zjP¯ 1j xj since P¯j = Pˆ 1j . Hence (xT , zj)P¯ 1T∪{j}(xT , xj).
Therefore, according to the definition of (xT , xj) in P¯
1, we have ϕT∪{j},(xT ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) =
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ϕT∪{j},(xT ,zj)(Pˆ
1, P 2) for all zjPˆ
1
j xj. Furthermore, since τ(P¯
1
S , AS) = τ(Pˆ
1
S , AS) = τ(P
2
S , AS) =
bS, Lemma 4 implies that ϕ(xT ,zj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕT∪{j},(xT ,zj)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕT∪{j},(xT ,zj)(Pˆ
1, P 2) =
ϕ(xT ,zj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2) for all zjPˆ
1
j xj.
Hence∑
z∈Bˆ
ϕz(Pˆ
1, P 2)
=
∑
zT Pˆ
1
T xT
∑
zM−T∈AM−T
ϕ(zT ,zM−T )(Pˆ
1, P 2) +
∑
zj Pˆ 1j xj
ϕ(xT ,zj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2) + ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(Pˆ
1, P 2)
<
∑
zT Pˆ
1
T xT
∑
zM−T∈AM−T
ϕ(zT ,zM−T )(P¯
1, P 2) +
∑
zj Pˆ 1j xj
ϕ(xT ,zj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2) + ϕ(xT ,xj ,bS)(P¯
1, P 2)
=
∑
z∈Bˆ
ϕz(P¯
1, P 2).
Therefore, voter 1 will manipulate at (Pˆ 1, P 2) via P¯ 1. In conclusion, ϕj(P¯
1, P 2) =
ϕj(Pˆ
1, P 2) which establishes the claim.
Similarly we can find Pˆ 2 ∈ DL where j is lexicographically worst and ϕj(Pˆ ) = ϕj(P ).
Therefore ϕj,cj(Pˆ ) > 0. Note that τ(Pˆ
i
j , Aj) 6= cj for i = 1, 2. Hence we are in the situation
described in Case 1 and we can use the same arguments to show that ϕj,cj(Pˆ ) > 0 is not
possible. ¥
According to our next lemma, the outcome of a strategy-proof RSCF in the two-voter
case is identical across marginally equivalent profiles.
Lemma 9 Let P, P¯ ∈ [DL]2 be marginally equivalent profiles. Then ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P¯ ).
Proof : Let P, P¯ ∈ [DS]2 be marginally equivalent profiles. Suppose τ(P 1) = a and τ(P 2) =
b. Since P and P¯ are marginally equivalent it follows that τ(P¯ 1) = a and τ(P¯ 2) = b.
Moreover ajP
1
j bj, ajP¯
1
j bj and bjP
2
j aj, bjP¯
2
j aj for all j ∈ M whenever aj and bj are distinct.
According to Lemma 8, the support of the lotteries ϕ(P ) and ϕ(P¯ ) are the same and equal
to the set {a1, b1} × . . . × {am, bm}. We will show that these lotteries are in fact, equal to
each other. We prove this by induction on the number of components.
The result follows from the Gibbard random dictatorship result in the case where m = 1.
Assume now that the following is true.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): Suppose there are t ≥ 2 components. Let P, P¯ ∈ [DL]2 be
marginally equivalent profiles. Then ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P¯ ) for all unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCFs ϕ[DL]2 → L(A).
We will show that Lemma 9 holds in the case of t+ 1 components. We will prove this in
two steps.
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Claim 2: Suppose that there are t + 1 components. Let P, P¯ ∈ [DL]2 be two profiles such
that there exists a component assumed without loss of generality to be component t+1 and
1. τ(P 1t+1) = τ(P
2
t+1) = xt+1 and τ(P¯
1
t+1) = τ(P¯
2
t+1) = yt+1
2. P ik = P¯
i
k for i = 1, 2 and all components k = 1, . . . t.
Then ϕ(a,xt+1)(P ) = ϕ(a,yt+1)(P¯ ) for all t-component alternatives a.
Let P−(t+1) and P¯−(t+1) denote the profiles of preferences induced over all components
other than t + 1 by the profiles P and P¯ respectively. Observe that P−(t+1) and P¯−(t+1) are
marginally equivalent over all components other than t+ 1 by 2 above. Applying Lemma 7,
we know that there exists a t component strategy-proof RSCF ϕ′ such that
(i) [ϕ(a,at+1)(P ) > 0]⇒ [at+1 = xt+1]
(ii) [ϕ(a,at+1)(P¯ ) > 0]⇒ [at+1 = yt+1]
(iii) ϕ(a,xt+1)(P ) = ϕ
′
a(P−(t+1))
(iv) ϕ(a,yt+1)(P¯ ) = ϕ
′
a(P¯−(t+1))
Note that IH implies that ϕ′a(P−(t+1)) = ϕ
′
a(P¯−(t+1)). Therefore ϕ(a,xt+1)(P ) = ϕ(a,yt+1)(P¯ ).
This completes Claim 2.
We now complete the proof of the induction step. In view of Claim 2 the only case
that needs to be considered is the one where τ(P 1) = a and τ(P 2) = b and aj 6= bj for all
j = 1, . . . t+1. Suppose that ϕ(P 1, P 2) 6= ϕ(P¯ 1, P 2). (Recall that P 1 and P¯ 1 are marginally
equivalent.) There must exist x, y ∈ TPS(P ) = TPS(P¯ ) such that xP 1y and yP¯ 1x. We
claim that there must exist at least two components say j and k such that xj 6= yj and
xk 6= yk. Of course, at least one such component is required; otherwise x = y. Suppose there
exists exactly one such component, say j. Then separability of preference orderings would
imply that the marginal preferences over component j have switched between P 1 and P¯ 1
contradicting our hypothesis that P 1 and P¯ 1 are marginally equivalent.
From Lemma 3 we know that there exist j, k ∈ M , aj ∈ Aj and ak ∈ Ak such that
ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2) > ϕj,aj(P ) and ϕk,ak(P¯
1, P 2) < ϕk,ak(P ).
4
Consider the second ranked alternative x in P 2. There must exist a unique component
say l such that xl 6= bl and xj = bj for all j 6= l. In fact, we can assume w.l.o.g that xl = al.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: j 6= l. Let P˜ 1 be an ordering such that (i) component j is lexicographically best
and (ii) τ(P˜ 1, A) = a. If ϕj,aj(P˜
1, P 2) < ϕj,aj(P¯
1, P 2), then voter 1 will manipulate at
4The proof of this claim requires consideration of several cases. These are routine and we omit the details.
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(P˜ 1, P 2) via P¯ 1. Therefore ϕj,aj(P˜
1, P 2) ≥ ϕj,aj(P¯ 1, P 2). Let Pˆ 1 be an ordering where (i) j
is the lexicographic best component (ii) τ(Pˆ 1l , Al) = bl and (iii) Pˆ
1
M−l = P
1
M−l. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj,aj(Pˆ
1, P2) = ϕj,aj(P˜
1, P2). Hence ϕj,aj(Pˆ
1, P2) > ϕj,aj(P ). Observe that at the
profile (Pˆ 1, P 2), both voters have a common maximal alternative bl for component l.
Let P˜ 2 be a lexicographic ordering where j and l are the best and the worst components
respectively and τ(P˜ 2, A) = b. Using the same argument as before, ϕj,bj(P
1, P˜ 2) ≥ ϕj,bj(P )
i.e. by Lemma 4, ϕj,aj(P
1, P˜ 2) ≤ ϕj,aj(P ). Let Pˆ 2 be a lexicographic ordering such that (i)
components j and l are the best and worst respectively (ii) τ(Pˆ 2l , Al) = al and (iii) Pˆ
2
M−l =
P 2M−l. As before, ϕj,bj(P
1, P˜ 2) = ϕj,bj(P
1, Pˆ 2). Then Lemma 8 implies ϕj,aj(P
1, P˜ 2) =
ϕj,aj(P
1, Pˆ 2) so that ϕj,aj(P
1, Pˆ 2) ≤ ϕj,aj(P ).
Observe that at the profile (P 1, Pˆ 2), both voters have a common maximal alternative al
for component l. By Lemma 4 and Claim 2 above (in the proof of this Lemma), we must
have ϕj,aj(Pˆ
1, P 2) = ϕj,aj(P
1, Pˆ 2). However, we have shown that ϕj,aj(Pˆ
1, P2) > ϕj,aj(P ) ≥
ϕaj(P
1, Pˆ 2). We have a contradiction.
Case 2: j = l. Let P˜ 2 be a lexicographic ordering where component k is lexicographically
best. Using a similar argument as before we have ϕk,ak(P¯
1, P˜ 2) ≤ ϕk,ak(P¯ 1, P 2). Let Pˆ 2
be a lexicographic ordering where k is the best and τ(Pˆ 2l , Al) = al. By strategy-proofness,
ϕk,ak(P
1, Pˆ 2) = ϕk,ak(P
1, P˜ 2). Hence ϕk,ak(P
1, Pˆ 2) < ϕk,ak(P ). Observe that at the profile
(P 1, Pˆ 2), both voters have a common maximal alternative al for component l.
Let P˜ 1 be a lexicographic ordering where k and l are the best and the worst components
respectively. Using the same argument as before, ϕk,ak(P˜
1, P 2) ≥ ϕk,ak(P ). Let Pˆ 1 be a
lexicographic ordering such that component k and l are the best and worst respectively and
τ(Pˆ 1l , Al) = bl. As before, ϕk,ak(P˜
1, P 2) = ϕk,ak(Pˆ
1, P 2) so that ϕk,ak(Pˆ
1, P 2) ≥ ϕk,ak(P ).
Observe that at the profile (Pˆ 1, P 2), both voters have a common maximal alternative bl for
component l. By the same argument as at the end of Case 1, it follows that ϕk,ak(Pˆ
1, P 2) =
ϕk,ak(P
1, Pˆ 2). However, we have shown that ϕk,ak(Pˆ
1, P 2) > ϕk,ak(P ) ≥ ϕk,ak(P 1, Pˆ 2). We
have a contradiction. ¥
The next Lemma establishes the following: the probability distribution on the top product
set of the two voters depends on the maximal alternatives of the voters.
Lemma 10 For all P, P¯ ∈ [DL]2 such that τ(P ik, Ak) = τ(P¯ ik, Ak) for all k ∈ M and i ∈ I,
we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P¯ ).
Proof : Let Q ⊆ M be such that for all j ∈ Q, τ(P 1j , Aj) 6= τ(P 2j , Aj) and for all k ∈
M − Q, τ(P 1k , Ak) = τ(P 2k , Ak). (It is possible that M − Q = ∅.) Assume w.l.o.g that
(i) τ(P 1j , Aj) = τ(P¯
1
j , Aj) = xj and τ(P
2
j , Aj) = yj for all j ∈ Q and (ii) τ(P 1k , Ak) =
τ(P¯ 1k , Ak) = τ(P
2
k , Ak) = zk for all k ∈ M − Q. Therefore, TPS(P 1, P 2) = TPS(P¯ 1, P 2) =∏
j∈Q{xj, yj} ×
∏
k∈M−Q{zk}.
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We claim that P 1 and P¯ 2 agree on TPS(P 1, P 2). By Lemma 9, we can assume that P 1
and P¯ 1 have a common lexicographic ordering over components which has the property that
Q lexicographically dominates M −Q. Given a, b ∈ TPS(P 1, P 2), let k be lexicographically
maximal component such that ak 6= bk. Then, it is evident that k ∈ Q. Since ak, bk ∈
{xk, yk}, xkP 1k yk and xkP¯ 1k yk, if akP 1k bk, it must be the case that aP 1b, ak = xk and bk = yk.
Hence, akP¯
1
k bk. Furthermore, since P
1 and P¯ 1 agree on the lexicographic order, it is true
that aP¯ 1b. Symmetrically, we also show that [aP¯ 1b]⇒ [aP 1b] for all a, b ∈ TPS(P 1, P 2).
Next, to simplify the notation, we assume that TPS(P 1, P 2) = {ak}Tk=1 for some integer
T > 0 such that akP 1ak+1, k = 1, . . . , T − 1. Hence, akP¯ 1ak+1, k = 1, . . . , T − 1. By Lemma
8, we know that for all x ∈ A− TPS(P 1, P 2), ϕx(P 1, P 2) = ϕx(P¯ 1, P 2) = 0. Therefore, for
all k = 2, . . . , T ,
∑
x∈B(ak,P 1) ϕx(P
1, P 2) =
∑k
s=1 ϕas(P
1, P 2) and
∑
x∈B(ak,P¯ 1) ϕx(P¯
1, P 2) =∑k
s=1 ϕas(P¯
1, P 2). Meanwhile, since P 1 and P¯ 2 agree on TPS(P 1, P 2), we also have that for
all k = 2, . . . , T ,
∑
x∈B(ak,P¯ 1) ϕx(P
1, P 2) =
∑k
s=1 ϕas(P
1, P 2) and
∑
x∈B(ak,P 1) ϕx(P¯
1, P 2) =∑k
s=1 ϕas(P¯
1, P 2). Therefore, by strategy-proofness, we have that for all k = 2, . . . , T ,∑k
s=1 ϕas(P
1, P 2) =
∑k
s=1 ϕas(P¯
1, P 2). Furthermore, strategy-proofness also implies that
ϕa1(P
1, P 2) = ϕa1(P¯
1, P 2). Therefore, ϕak(P
1, P 2) = ϕak(P¯
1, P 2) for all k = 1, . . . , T .
Now, we conclude that for all x ∈ TPS(P 1, P 2), ϕx(P 1, P 2) = ϕx(P¯ 1, P 2) and for all x ∈
A− TPS(P 1, P 2), ϕx(P 1, P 2) = ϕx(P¯ 1, P 2) = 0. Consequently, ϕ(P 1, P 2) = ϕ(P¯ 1, P 2).
Applying the same argument to voter 2, we can show that ϕ(P¯ 1, P 2) = ϕ(P¯ 1, P¯ 2). There-
fore, ϕ(P 1, P 2) = ϕ(P¯ 1, P¯ 2). ¥
Lemma 11 Let j ∈ M , P ∈ [DL]2, P¯ i ∈ DL and (xj, zM−j), (yj, zM−j) ∈ A be such that
(i) τ(P ik, Ak) = τ(P¯
i
k, Ak) for all k 6= j (ii) τ(P ij , Aj) = xj and τ(P¯ ij , Aj) = yj and (iii)
(xj, zM−j) ∈ TPS(P ). Then
ϕ(xj ,zM−j)(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕ(yj ,zM−j)(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕ(xj ,zM−j)(P ) + ϕ(yj ,zM−j)(P ).
Moreover
ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P ) for all dj /∈ {xj, yj}.
Proof : In view of Lemmas 8, 9 and 10 we can assume without loss of generality that (i) j
is the lexicographically worst component in P i and P¯ i (ii) P iM−j = P¯
i
M−j for all k 6= j and
(iii) (xj, zM−j) and (yj, zM−j) are contiguous in P i. Suppose (aj, zM−j)P i(xj, zM−j) where
aj 6= yj. Since j is the lexicographically worst component and (xj, zM−j) and (yj, zM−j)
are contiguous it follows that (aj, zM−j)P¯ i(yj, zM−j). Similarly (aj, zM−j)P¯ i(yj, zM−j) ⇒
(aj, zM−j)P i(xj, zM−j). Now suppose (aj, bM−j)P i(xj, zM−j) where bM−j 6= zM−j. From our
assumptions, bM−jP iM−jzM−j. Hence bM−jP¯
i
M−jzM−j and (aj, bM−j)P¯
i(yj, zM−j). Similarly,
(aj, bM−j)P¯ i(yj, zM−j) implies (aj, bM−j)P i(xj, zM−j). Hence P¯ i is a feasible local switch of
(xj, zM−j) and (yj, zM−j). The result now follows from Lemma 1.
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To show the second part of the Lemma, note that ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P ) = 0
if dj 6= τ(P−ij , Aj). Suppose dj = τ(P−ij , Aj). Again, using Lemmas 8 and 9, we can
assume that dj is ranked third in both P
i
j and P¯
i
j . This implies that B((dj, zM−j), P
i) =
B((dj, zM−j), P¯ i). Now strategy-proofness implies that ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P¯
i, P−i) = ϕ(dj ,zM−j)(P ).
¥
We now complete the proof of Step 2. Let P ∈ [DL]2 be such that τ(P 1) = a and
τ(P 2) = b where aj 6= bj for all j ∈ M . Pick an arbitrary i ∈ Im and let γ(i) = ϕx(P )
where χ(x, P ) = i. Since the maximal alternatives of the two voters for each component
are distinct, there exists a unique i ∈ Im for every x ∈ TPS(P ) such that χ(x, P ) = {i}.
Therefore ∑
i∈Im
γ(i) =
∑
x∈TPS(P )
ϕx(P ) = 1
where the second equality follows from the fact that ϕ satisfies the TPS property (Lemma
8).
Now consider j ∈M and P¯ 1 ∈ D such that τ(P¯ 1j , Aj) = cj 6= bj and τ(P¯ 1k , Ak) = ak for all
k 6= j. Let x ∈ TPS(P ). Observe that [i ∈ χ((aj, xM−j), P )]⇔ [i ∈ χ((cj, xM−j), (P¯ 1, P 2)].
Now applying Lemma 11 and the fact that (cj, xM−j) /∈ TPS(P ) and (aj, xM−j) /∈ TPS(P¯ 1, P 2),
we conclude that ϕ(aj ,xM−j)(P ) = ϕ(cj ,xM−j)(P¯
1, P 2). Using this and the second part of
Lemma 11, it follows that ϕx(P¯
1, P 2) =
∑
i∈χ(x,(P¯ 1,P 2)) γ(i).
Now consider the case where τ(P¯ 1j , Aj) = bj. Let x ∈ TPS(P ). Observe that [i ∈
χ((aj, xM−j), P )∪ χ((bj, xM−j), P )]⇔ [i ∈ χ((bj, xM−j), (P¯ 1, P 2)]. Now applying Lemma 11
and noting the fact that (aj, xM−j) /∈ TPS(P¯ 1, P 2), we have
ϕ(bj ,xM−j)(P¯
1, P 2) = ϕ(aj ,xM−j)(P ) + ϕ(bj ,xM−j)(P ).
Once again, we have ϕx(P¯
1, P 2) =
∑
i∈χ(x,(P¯ 1,P 2)) γ(i) for all x ∈ A. Progressively re-
placing the maximal alternative of each component in voter 1 and voter 2’s preferences and
noting that the previous expression holds at all profiles along the sequence, we conclude that
the expression holds for all profiles P . This establishes generalized random dictatorship for
the case N = 2 and completes Step 2.
Step 3: Let N > 2 be an integer. We assume the following:
Induction Hypothesis (IH*). For all integers K < N , if ϕ : [DL]K → L(A) is strategy-proof
and satisfies unanimity, then it is a generalized random dictatorship.
Let ϕ : [DL]N → L(A) be a strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity. We will show that
it is a generalized random dictatorship.
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Let I ′ = {1′, 3, . . . , N} be a set of N −1 voters where voters 3, . . . , N are the same voters
as in the set I. Voter 1′ is a voter obtained by “cloning” voters 1 and 2 in I. Define a RSCF
over the voter set I ′, g : [DL]N−1 → L(A) as follows:
g(P 1
′
, P 3 . . . , PN) = ϕ(P 1, P 1, P 3, . . . , PN) for all P 1, P 3, . . . , PN ∈ DL
It is clear that g satisfies unanimity.
Claim 3: g is strategy-proof.
Fix an arbitrary voter profile in I ′, (P 1
′
, P 3, . . . , PN) ∈ [DL]N−1 and let P¯ 1 ∈ DL. Let
a ∈ A. Since ϕ is strategy-proof
∑
x∈B(a,P 1′ )
gx(P
1′ , P 3, . . . , PN) =
∑
x∈B(a,P 1′ )
ϕx(P
1, P 1, . . . , PN)
≥
∑
x∈B(a,P 1′ )
ϕx(P¯
1, P 1, . . . , PN) (1)
≥
∑
x∈B(a,P 1′ )
ϕx(P¯
1, P¯ 1, . . . , PN) (2)
=
∑
x∈B(a,P 1′ )
gx(P¯
1′ , P 3, . . . , PN).
Note that inequalities 1 and 2 follow from the strategy-proofness of ϕ.
Since a was arbitrary, voter 1′ cannot manipulate in g. If voters 3, . . . , N can manipulate
g, they can also manipulate ϕ. Hence g is strategy-proof establishing Claim 3.
It follows from Induction Hypothesis* that g is a generalized random dictatorship. Let
γg be the function associated with g. We will write ig ∈ I ′m for a voter sequence where
igj ∈ I ′ for all j ∈M . Hence
gx(P
1′ , P 2, . . . , PN) =
∑
ig∈χ(x,(P 1′ ,P 3...PN ))
γg(ig)
for all x ∈ A.
Let T ⊂ M . Let iˆ−T be an assignment of voters in {3, . . . , n} to components in M − T .
In particular iˆ−T (k) is the voter in {3, . . . , n} assigned to component k ∈M − T .
We shall let iˆ(T ) denote the voter sequence where voter 1′ is assigned to all components
in T and iˆ−T (k) is assigned to components k ∈M − T . Thus iˆ(T ) assigns 1′ to components
in T and agrees with iˆ−T on M − T .
An extra piece of notation will be useful. Let b ∈ A and P ∈ [DL]N . Let
Z(b, P, T ) = {i ∈ χ(b, P ) and ik /∈ {1, 2} for some k ∈ T}
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In other words, Z(b, P, T ) is the set of voter sequences in Im consistent with outcome b
and profile P such that neither voter 1 nor 2 appear for some component in the set T .
Fix T and iˆ(T ). Pick an arbitrary x−T ∈ AM−T . We say that P ∈ [DL]N is an (ˆi(T ), x−T )
extension of (P 1T , P
2
T ) if
(i) P induces (P 1T , P
2
T ) for voters 1 and 2 and component set T .
(ii) xk = τ(P
iˆ(T )k
k ) 6= τ(P rk ) for all r 6= iˆ(T )k and k ∈M − T .
(iii) τ(P 1k ) = τ(P
2
k ) for all k ∈M − T .
We proceed in two steps.
Step α: For all iˆ(T ) such that γg (ˆi(T )) = 0, we let γ(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) = 0 for all i(T ) such that
i(T )k ∈ {1, 2} for all k ∈ T .
Step β: We consider iˆ(T ) such that γg (ˆi(T )) 6= 0, i.e. the iˆ(T )’s remaining after Step α has
been completed. Our strategy here is to define a two-voter RSCF h for voters 1 and 2 over
component set T depending on iˆ(T ). We do so inductively on the size of T .
Consider T such that |T | = 1 Fix x−T ∈ AM−T . Define a two-voter, one-component
probabilistic rule hT as follows: for all profiles (P 1T , P
2
T ),
hiˆ(T )aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) =
1
γg (ˆi(T ))
[ϕ(aT ,x−T )(P )−
∑
i∈Z((aT ,x−T ),P,T )
γg(i)] (3)
where P is an (ˆi(T ), x−T ) extension of (P 1T , P
2
T ).
We will show that hiˆ(T ) is a RSCF, i.e. all the relevant probabilities are non-negative
and add up to one. Moreover, it is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity. Using Step 2 for
two-person, one-component RSCFs, we will deduce that hiˆ(T ) is a random dictatorship with
probability weights, γiˆ(T )(1) and γiˆ(T )(2). Next, we let γ(1T , iˆ(T )−T ) = γ
g (ˆi(T )).γiˆ(T )(1) and
γ(2T , iˆ(T )−T ) = γg (ˆi(T )).γiˆ(T )(2). Here (1T , iˆ(T )−T ) refers to a voter sequence where voter
1 appears for component T while the rest of the components agree with iˆ(T )−T . A similar
interpretation holds for (2T , iˆ(T )−T ). For all i ∈ Im such that ik /∈ {1, 2} for all k ∈ M ,
let γ(i) = γg(i). We conduct this procedure with respect to all iˆ(T ) such that |T | = 1 and
obtain the corresponding γ’s.
In the next step, we consider iˆ(T ) such that |T | = 2. Once again, we define a two-voter,
two-component probabilistic rule hT as follows: for all profiles (P 1T , P
2
T ),
hiˆ(T )aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) =
1
γg (ˆi(T ))
[ϕ(aT ,x−T )(P )−
∑
i∈Z((aT ,x−T ),P,T )
γ(i)] (4)
where P is an (ˆi(T ), x−T ) extension of (P 1T , P
2
T ).
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Note that we are only using the γ’s that we have constructed in the earlier step. We
will again show that hiˆ(T ) is a RSCF, is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity. Appeal-
ing to Step 2, we deduce that hiˆ(T ) is a generalized random dictatorship with associated
weights γiˆ(T )(i(T )) where i(T )k ∈ {1, 2} for all k ∈ T . Thus, i(T ) is a voter sequence
for the components in set T where each element of the sequence is either 1 or 2. We let
γ(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) = γg (ˆi(T )).γiˆ(T )(i(T )). Once again, we conduct this procedure with respect
to all iˆ(T ) such that |T | = 2 and obtain the corresponding γ’s.
It is clear that we can continue this process till |T | = m. In the general step, we consider
iˆ(T ) with |T | = k + 1 after having applied the procedure for all iˆ(T ) with |T | ≤ k and
obtained the corresponding γ’s. The probabilistic rule hiˆ(T ) is obtained as follows: for all
profiles (P 1T , P
2
T ),
hiˆ(T )aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) =
1
γg (ˆi(T ))
[ϕ(aT ,x−T )(P )−
∑
i∈Z((aT ,x−T ),P,T )
γ(i)] (5)
where P is an (ˆi(T ), x−T ) extension of (P 1T , P
2
T ).
Note once again that the γ’s in the bracketed term in the RHS of the equation above only
uses the γ’s obtained in the previous steps. Eventually, we will obtain γ(i) for all i ∈ Im.
We will proceed in two steps.
Step A. Consider T such that |T | = 1. We show that hiˆg(T ) as defined in Equation 3 is an RSCF.
In addition, it is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity. By virtue of Step 2, hiˆ
g(T ) is a
random dictatorship. Finally we show that this random dictatorship is (appropriately)
independent of the extension.
Step B. Suppose that for all T such that |T | < k, hiˆ(T ) as defined in Equation 5 is an RSCF
which is strategy-proof, satisfies unanimity and (appropriately) independent of the
extension. Then, we show that the same is true for hiˆ(T ) for |T | = k + 1.
Step A: Let T = {j}. Note that hiˆg(T ) is a one-component rule (on component j) because
all components other than j are fixed by the extension procedure. The claim that hiˆ
g({j}) is
a RSCF follows immediately from Lemmas 4 and 5 in Sen (2011). Moreover, it is strategy-
proof and satisfies unanimity. It follows from Step 2 that hiˆ({j}) is a j-component random
dictatorship for players 1 and 2. Denote these probability weights by γiˆg({j})(1) and γiˆg({j})(2).
Note that these weights depend (amongst other things) on x−{M−j} chosen for the extension.
Lemma 12 The probability weights γiˆg({j})(1) and γiˆg({j})(2) do not depend on the x−{M−j}
chosen for the extension.
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Proof : Suppose that the lemma is false, i.e. suppose that there exists x−{j}, y−{j} ∈ AM−{j}
with associated probability weights γ(1), γ(2) and γ′(1), γ′(2) where γ(1) 6= γ′(1). 5 Assume
without loss of generality that γ(1) > γ(2). Assume further that xM−{j} and yM−{j} differ
over a single component, say k. For convenience, let voter iˆg({j})k be denoted as voter s. In
other words, voter s, s 6= 1′ is the voter corresponding to component k in the voter sequence
iˆg. Let P ∈ [DL]N such that
(i) τ(P sk , Ak) = xk.
(ii) The second-ranked alternative in the k-th component ranking P sk is yk.
(iii) k is the lexicographic worst component in P s.
(iv) τ(P 1j , Aj) = τ(P
s
j , Aj) = aj 6= bj = τ(P 2j , Aj).
(v) P is an (ˆig({j}), xM−j) extension of (P 1j , P 2j ).
Let τ(P s, A) = (aj, xk, dM−{j,k}) for some dM−{j,k} ∈ AM−{j,k}. From (ii) and (iii)
above, it is clear that the second ranked alternative in P s is (aj, yk, dM−{j,k}). (Note that
xM−{j} = (xk, dM−{j,k}) and yM−{j} = (yk, dM−{j,k})). Since P is an (ˆig({j}), xM−j) extension
of (P 1j , P
2
j ), it follows from straightforward algebraic manipulation and strategy-proofness of
ϕ (for details, see Sen (2011)) that the total probability on the first and second ranked
alternatives in P s in the profile P is
γ(1).γg (ˆig) +
∑
i∈Z((aj ,xk,dM−{j,k}),P,{j})
γg(i) +
∑
i∈Z((aj ,yk,dM−{j,k})),P,{j})
γg(i). (6)
Now suppose s changes her announcement to P¯ s where the first and second ranked
alternatives are interchanged. This is feasible because k is the lexicographic worst component.
If (P¯ s, P−s) is not an extension of (P 1j , P
2
j ), there is nothing to be proved. Suppose, on the
other hand that it is an extension. By virtue of earlier arguments, the total probability on
the first and second ranked alternatives in P s in the profile P is
γ′(1).γg (ˆig) +
∑
i∈Z((aj ,xk,dM−{j,k}),P,{j})
γg(i) +
∑
i∈Z((aj ,yk,dM−{j,k})),P,{j})
γg(i). (7)
Since γ(1) 6= γ′(1) by assumption, it follows that expression 6 6= expression 7 contradicting
the strategy-proofness of ϕ. Progressively changing the components of xM−j to yM−j and
applying the argument at every stage completes the proof. ¥
REMARK: Note that the argument in the Lemma above also works for the case where voter
s in the construction above, is one of the voters 1 or 2. The only case that remains is when
5We drop the subscripts and superscripts for convenience.
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voter s 6= 1, 2 and the maximal alternative in a component k other than j for either voter 1
or 2 coincides with the maximal element in component k for s. We do not have to deal with
this situation in Steps A or B - we therefore address it in the final step of the proof.
Step B: Fix T ⊂ M and iˆ(T ) such that |T | = k + 1. Following the procedure outlined
previously, we have obtained probability weights γ(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ), for all T such that |T | ≤ k.
As described earlier, i(T ) is a voter sequence over components in T where element of the
sequence is either 1 or 2. Thus, (i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) is a voter sequence that is either 1 or 2 for
all components in T and agrees with iˆ(T ) in M − T (i.e. consists of voters from 3 through
N). Moreover, the γ’s so obtained are appropriately independent of the extensions used to
generate them.
Consider the probabilistic rule hiˆ(T ) in the general step (Equation 5). Observe that hiˆ(T )
is well-defined, i.e. all the terms in the summation on the RHS of Equation 5 are known. We
will show that it is a strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity. We begin with a preliminary
Lemma.
Lemma 13 Suppose τ(P 1T ) = τ(P
2
T ) = aT . Let P be an (ˆi(T ), xT ) extension of (P
1
T , P
2
T ).
Then
ϕ(bT ,x−T )(P ) =
∑
ig∈χ((bT ,x−T ),P )
γg(ig)
for all bT ∈ AT . 6
Proof : In view of the definition of an extension, we can assume w.l.o.g τ(P 1) = τ(P 2) = a.
We know from IH* that
ϕ(bT ,x−T )(P
1, P 1, P 3, . . . , PN) =
∑
ig∈χ((bT ,x−T ),P )
γg(ig)
where (P 1, P 3, . . . , PN) are obtained from the extension P . Pick k ∈ M − T and c =
(xk, aM−k). Assume w.l.o.g. that ϕc(P 1, P 2, P 3, . . . , PN) > ϕc(P 1, P 1, P 3, . . . , PN) (clearly,
such a c must exist). Pick P¯ 2 ∈ DL such that a and c are the first and second ranked
alternatives in P¯ 2 respectively. This is possible by making k the lexicographically worst
component. By strategy-proofness
6We are abusing notation slightly here. In the term
∑
ig∈χ((bT ,x−T ),P ) γ
g(ig) in the expression above,
the P in χ((bT , x−T ), P ) refers to the N − 1 profile (P 1′ , P 3, . . . , PN ) where P 1′ = P 1. We freely use this
notation in the rest of the proof - the interpretation should be evident from the context.
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ϕa(P
1, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN) = ϕa(P
1, P 2, P 3, . . . , PN)
⇒ ϕc(P 1, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN) ≥ ϕc(P 1, P 2, P 3, . . . , PN)
⇒ ϕc(P 1, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN) > ϕc(P 1, P 1, P 3, . . . , PN)
= ϕc(P¯
2, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN)
Also, ϕa(P
1, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN) = ϕa(P¯
2, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN). Hence voter 1 manipulates at
(P¯ 2, P¯ 2, P 3, . . . , PN) via P 1.
Now pick k, l ∈M−T and consider d = (dk, dl, aM−{k,l}) such that ϕd(P 1, P 2, P 3, . . . , PN) >
ϕd(P
1, P 1, P 3, . . . , PN). We know from the preceding argument that ϕc(P
1, P 2, . . . , PN) =∑
ig∈χ(c,P ) γ
g(ig) for all c = (cj, aM−j) and all j ∈M−T . Now consider P¯ 2 ∈ DL where k and
l are the lexicographically worst components. Moreover P¯ 2 such that a = τ(P¯ 2) and all al-
ternatives better than d differ from a in exactly one component. We can replicate the earlier
argument to show that ϕd(P
1, P 2, . . . , PN) =
∑
ig∈χ(d,P ) γ
g(ig). Moreover, applying the argu-
ment repeatedly, we can conclude that ϕ(aT ,x−T )(P
1, P 2, . . . , PN) =
∑
ig∈χ((aT ,x−T ),P ) γ
g(ig).
In the same way, we can progressively switch single components in T from aT to some arbi-
trary bT to show that ϕ(bT ,x−T )(P
1, P 2, . . . , PN) =
∑
ig∈χ((bT ,x−T ,P ) γ
g(ig). ¥
Our next Lemma establishes that the probabilistic rule hiˆ(T ) is an RSCF.
Lemma 14 For all (P 1T , P
2
T ),
(i)
∑
aT∈AT h
iˆ(T )
aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) = 1,
(ii) h
iˆ(T )
aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) ≥ 0 for all aT ∈ AT .
Proof : We begin with (i). Consider first the situation where τ(P 1T ) = τ(P
2
T ) = aT . In view
of Lemma 13, we can assume w.l.o.g. that P 1T = P
2
T . Moreover, our extension rule implies
that P 1 = P 2. We know from Induction Hypothesis* and the definition of g that
ϕ(aT ,x−T )(P
1, P 2, P 3, . . . , PN) = gaT (P
1′ , P 3, . . . , PN)
=
∑
ig∈χ(aT ,x−T ),(P 1′ ,P 3,...,PN ))
γg(ig)
= γg (ˆi(T )) +
∑
i∈Z((aT ,x−T ),(P 1′ ,P 3,...,PN ),T )
γ(i) (8)
The last step in Equation 8 holds for the following reasons. Since τ(P 1k ) = τ(P
2
k ) 6= xk
for all k ∈ M − T , it follows that if ig ∈ χ(aT , x−T ), (P 1′ , P 3, . . . , PN)), 1′ can appear only
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for components in T . Therefore χ((aT , x−T ), (P 1
′
, P 3, . . . , PN)) can be partitioned into two
components, one being iˆ(T ) and the other being Z((aT , x−T ), (P 1
′
, P 3, . . . , PN)).
Now using Equation 5, it follows that h
iˆ(T )
aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) = 1. Consider bT 6= aT . Note
that iˆ(T ) /∈ χ((bT , x−T ), (P 1′ , P 3, . . . , PN)). Using Equation 5 once again, we infer that
h
iˆ(T )
bT
(P 1T , P
2
T ) = 0.
Consider an arbitrary profile (P 1T , P
2
T ). We can start with the profile (P
2
T , P
2
T ) and reach
(P 1T , P
2
T ) by switching adjacent “blocks” of alternatives in P
1
T . The total probability on two
adjacent blocks is conserved under switching of these blocks by the strategy-proofness of ϕ.
It follows that the sum of the probabilities of the maximal elements of P 1T and P
2
T in h
iˆ(T )
remains unchanged at the RHS of Equation 8. This implies that the total probability of all
alternatives in the domain of hiˆ(T ) is one.
We now consider (ii). We have already shown in (i) that in the case where τ(P 1T ) =
τ(P 2T ) = aT , h
iˆ(T )
aT (P
1
T , P
2
T ) = 1 and h
iˆ(T )
bT
(P 1T , P
2
T ) = 0 for all bT 6= aT . Therefore hiˆ(T )cT (P 1T , P 2T ) ≥
0.
Suppose that aT = τ(P
1
T ) 6= τ(P 2T ) = bT . Consider an arbitrary alternative cT ∈ AT . Our
strategy is to construct another profile by“lowering” (cT , x−T ) as far as possible while making
the maximal alternatives of voters 1 and 2 (in the set T ) agree on at least one component
in T . We can then use the induction step the probability rule hiˆ(T
′) defined over component
set |T ′| < k+1, is an RSCF to conclude that probability of cT in this profile (under hiˆ(T ) or
(cT , c−T ) under ϕ), is non-negative. Now strategy-proofness of ϕ implies that the probability
of (cT , x−T ) in the original profile is no lower than its probability in the constructed profile
which we have argued to be non-negative.
In the special case where cT differs from aT and bT for all components in T , note that in
the domain of hiˆ(T ), cT can be made last and both voters made to have a common maximal
alternative in AT (either bT or aT ).
Suppose that cT agrees with aT for some component k ∈ T . If ck = bk, then ak = bk and
the non-negativity of h
iˆ(T )
cT follows immediately from the induction step. Assume therefore
that ck 6= bk. Construct a preference ordering P¯ 1T for voter 1 such that
(i) bk and ak are the best and worst elements in Ak according to P¯
1
k .
(ii) k is the lexicographically worst component in M .
(iii) P¯ 1T−k = P
1
T−k (this has been defined earlier).
It follows from our construction that B(cT , P
1
T ) ⊂ B(cT , P¯ 1T ) (in the domain of hiˆ(T ); for
ϕ, we append x−T to cT everywhere.) By strategy-proofness of ϕ, the probability of (cT , x−T )
under ϕ in the profile (P 1, P 2, . . . , PN) is at least as great as the probability of the same
alternative in (P¯ 1, P 2, . . . , PN). However, we know the induction step on the |T | that the
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probability of the latter (P¯ 1, P 2) under hiˆ(T ) is non-negative. This concludes our argument.
¥
Observe that we have already shown that hiˆ(T ) satisfies unanimity. The strategy-proofness
of hiˆ(T ) follows straightforwardly from its construction and the strategy-proofness of ϕ (we
omit the details of the argument). It now follows from Step 1 that hiˆ(T ) is a generalized
random dictatorship. Let the weights associated with this generalized random dictatorships
be denoted by γh(i(T )). Once again i(T ) is a voter sequence over components in T with
every element of the sequence being either voter 1 or 2. As before let,
γ(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) = γg (ˆi(T )).γhiˆ(T )(i(T ))
This procedure allows us to obtain the probability weights γ for all voter sequences where
the cloned voter appears over a set of components of size k + 1. Note that these probability
weights obtained at this Step depend on the extension xT . In order to complete Step B, we
need to show that these weights are, in fact, independent of the x−T chosen. this generalized
random dictatorship is appropriately extension-independent.
Lemma 15 Let γ = γ(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) and γ′ = γ′(i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) be the probability weights
associated with the extensions x−T and y−T respectively. Then γ = γ′.
Proof : We shall follow the arguments in Lemma 12 closely. As before, assume further that
x−T and y−T differs over a single component, say k. For convenience, let the voter in the kth
component of the voter sequence (i(T ), iˆ(T )−T ) be denoted by s. Pick a profile P ∈ [Dl]N
such that
(i) τ(P sk , Ak) = xk.
(ii) The second-ranked alternative in the k-th component ranking P sk is yk.
(iii) k is the lexicographic worst component in P s.
(iv) τ(P 1j , Aj) = τ(P
s
j , Aj) = aj 6= bj = τ(P 2j , Aj) for all j ∈ T .
(v) P is a (ˆi(T ), x−T ) extension of (P 1T , P
2
T ).
Let (aT , xk, dM−T−k) be the first-ranked alternative in P s. By construction, the second-
ranked alternative in this ordering is (aT , yk, dM−T−k). Using the definition of a generalized
random dictatorship, the total probability on these alternatives in in the profile P under ϕ,
is given by
γ.γg (ˆi(T )) +
∑
i∈Z((aT ,xk,dM−T−k),P,T )
γ(i) +
∑
i∈Z((aT ,yk,dM−T−k)),P,T )
γ(i). (9)
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Now suppose s changes her announcement to P¯ s where the first and second ranked
alternatives are interchanged. This is feasible because k is the lexicographic worst component.
If (P¯ s, P−s) is not an extension of (P 1j , P
2
j ), there is nothing to be proved. Suppose, on the
other hand that it is an extension. By virtue of earlier arguments, the total probability on
the first and second ranked alternatives in P s in the profile P is
γ′.γg (ˆi(T )) +
∑
i∈Z((aT ,xk,dM−T−k),P,T )
γ(i) +
∑
i∈Z((aT ,yk,dM−T−k)),P,T )
γ(i). (10)
Note that the γ terms in the summation terms in the RHS of both expressions 9 and 10
are obtained from the earlier steps with cardinality of T ≤ k. By the induction hypothesis,
these γ’s are independent of the extensions x−T and y−T . This justifies the use of the same
γ’s in the summation terms in the RHS of expressions 9 and 10. If γ 6= γ′, the two expressions
are different contradicting the strategy-proofness of ϕ. ¥
Our arguments thus far can be summarized as follows. We have constructed probability
weights γ(i) for every voter sequence i ∈ Im with the following property:
For any P ∈ [DL]N and a ∈ A such that there does not exist voters i, j ∈ I \ {1, 2} and
k ∈M with τ(P ik, Ak) = τ(P jk , Ak) = ak, we have
ϕa(P ) =
∑
i∈χ(a,P )
γ(i) (11)
Equation 11 is obtained by rearranging terms in Equation 5 and using our definition for
γ. In order to complete the proof of the Theorem, we will show that Equation 11 holds for
all profiles and alternatives.
Consider a profile P and an alternative a such that there exists exactly one component,
say k and exactly two voters i, j ∈ I \ {1, 2} such that τ(P ik, Ak) = τ(P jk , Ak) = ak and
τ(P 1k , Ak), τ(P
2
k , Ak) 6= ak, i.e. for all voters other than 1 and 2, their maximal alternatives
over components l 6= k differs from al. Moreover, all voters than i and j have maximal
alternatives in Ak different from ak. We will show that Equation 11 holds for this P .
Let ck ∈ Ak be such that it differs from the maximal alternative in Ak for all voters (such
an alternative exists because Ak has at least three alternatives). Assume w.l.o.g that k is
the lexicographically worst component and bk is second-ranked alternative in Ak (after ak)
for voter i. Now consider an ordering P¯ i where the top two alternatives in P ik are switched
(this is feasible by assumption). Observe that Equation 5 holds for the profile (P¯ i, P−i) for
the alternatives a and (bk, a−k). Therefore,
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ϕa(P¯
i, P−i) + ϕ(bk,a−k)(P¯
i, P−i) =
∑
i∈χ(a,(P¯ i,P−i))
γ(i) +
∑
i∈χ((bk,a−k),(P¯ i,P−i))
γ(i)
=
∑
i∈χ(a,P )
γ(i) (12)
Note that the second step in 12 follows because χ(a, P ) = χ(a, (P¯ i, P−i))∪χ((bk, a−k)(P¯ i, P−i)).
We will show that the LHS of Equation 12 in ϕa(P ).
Suppose that the claim above is false, i.e. ϕ(bk,a−k)(P¯
i, P−i) > 0. We can assume w.l.o.g
that (bk, a−k) is the worst element in P 2 (the only restrictions on P 2 require its maximal
elements to be different from those of the others). If voter 2 matches its maximal alternative
with that of voter 1, the probability on (bk, a−k) can be made to equal zero. This will be a
manipulation by voter 2. Therefore ϕa(P ) =
∑
i∈χ(a,P ) γ(i) as required.
We can apply this argument repeatedly to show that Equation 11 holds for any profile P
and any alternative a. This completes the proof of the Theorem. ¥
We have proved our result for lexicographically separable preferences. An important open
question is whether the result generalizes to separable supersets of this domain.
4 Conclusion
We have generalized the random dictatorship result of Gibbard (1977) to a multi-dimensional
setting where voter preferences are lexicographically separable. In particular we have shown
that strategy-proof random social choice functions satisfying unanimity are generalized ran-
dom dictatorships. These are induced by a fixed probability distribution on voter sequences
of length equal to the number of components. Although the joint distribution on outcomes
is not the product of strategy-proof component random social functions, we have shown that
the marginal probability distribution on each component at a preference profile depends
only on component preferences. Moreover the marginal random social choice functions are
in fact, strategy-proof and therefore random dictatorships. An important question for future
research is whether the decomposability of the marginal random social choice functions holds
more generally, for instance, for “rich domains” as defined in LeBreton and Sen (1999).
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